It's a Nationwide Fight Against Predatory Payday Lending

For numerous years, a fight has been going on from state to state and on a national level to curb and stop usurious payday lending.  This loan-sharking business exists by finding the cracks in the laws.  They hire sophisticated lawyers to find the legal loopholes, and slick PR firms to explain why they fill a need in the credit market.  They prey on desperate people and pretend to be a friend of the people who need credit.  The real nature of their business, however, is to be debt sharecroppers.  They gain an interest and claim on a person's future income in perpetuity.  It is a business designed to entrap borrowers so that they can never get out of debt.

I'll get a chance to speak about this predatory business at a public hearing on Tuesday, February 22, at the Texas Senate Committee on Business and Commerce.  I am impressed with the work of Texas Faith for Fair Lending, at whose invitation I will be speaking.  Some of these folks are the ones I used to work with as a wet-behind-the-ears seminary graduate in the mid-1980s.  In those days, these organizations were working to protect and provide for children in poverty and trying to hold off the tsunami of state-sponsored victimization through gambling businesses.  Suzii Paynter of the Texas Baptists Christian Life Commission will be part of the fight, and I am proud to get to work with such a distinguished drum major for justice.  The quoted material below comes from the Texas Faith for Fair Lending web site.  You can read the original at this link.

Payday Lenders and Car Title Lenders Evade Existing Texas Lending Laws

Although Texas lending laws provide generous regulatory and fee structures, payday lenders and car title lenders sidestep these provisions by posing as credit services organizations (CSOs), giving them an unfair advantage in the lending landscape.  As CSOs, payday and car title lenders operate outside of the bounds of the rules set for all other consumer lenders in the state and exploit a state law designed to protect consumers from seeking credit repair help. Both payday and auto title lenders could operate under Ch. 342.  For the smaller loans, auto title lenders could use the rate computations under 342F (or 342E).  For larger loans, they could operate under 342E.ⁱ

Below is a comparison of Texas's existing lending law which payday and car title lenders evade, and a snapshot of their abusive practices permitted by the CSO loophole.

It's Time to Level the Playing Field. 

The state's CSO statute was designed to protect consumers from abuse when seeking credit repair help, not as a vehicle for loans that result in long term indebtedness.  After more than 5 years of permitting this evasion of state law to continue, it is time for legislators to close this loophole, and ensure that these lenders operate under the Texas lending laws in place for all other consumer lenders.  It's time to close the loophole.

__________________

ⁱ The maximum loan under subchapter F is $1,240.  Under subchapter E, loans of up to $15,000 may be made.

ⁱⁱ Under existing Texas lending laws, finance charges for payday loans are set by the Texas Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner (OCCC).  Texas OCCC's authority to set these rates comes from TFC § 342.007, which allows the finance commission to establish rules for payday loans, and in TAC § 83.604(c) which incorporates the fees by reference.  For current Texas OCCC rates, see http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/int_rates/Index.html and click on the link for “Deferred Presentment Transaction Rate Charts.”  However, instead of complying with this law intended for them, payday lenders operate as CSOs, for whom there is no limit on finance charges, and rates reach upward of 500% APR (and higher) fur a loan that typically has a 14-day term.

ⁱⁱⁱ Under existing Texas lending laws, car title loans can carry finance charges consisting of a $10 set fee, plus $4 per $100 a month installment charge.  Car title loan finance charges are authorized under TFC § 342.253, which incorporates the fees permitted by TFC § 342.252 (3).  In addition to these finance charges, under existing Texas lending law, TFC § 342.502 (b) (5) expressly permits a “fee for recording a lien on or transferring certificate of title to a motor vehicle offered as a security for a loan.”  (The recording fee is not included in APR calculations because they are excludable from inclusion in the finance charge under the federal Truth in Lending, Act, Reg. Z § 226(e) (l).)  However, instead of complying with these state lending laws intended for them, car title lenders operate as CSOs, for whom there is no limit on finance charges, and rates reach upwards 300% APR fur a loan that typically has a 30-day term.

^iv Regardless if the cost is classified as "interest” or “fees” under state law, the cost to the borrower is the same.  The federal Truth in Lending Act requires that both interest and fees be combined and disclosed to borrowers as an Annual Percentage Rate (APR).  Federal law requires the cost of the all credit to be disclosed in terms APR, regardless of whether the loan is for two weeks or two years.

^v Existing Texas laws expressly permit payday loans to use a borrower's post-dated check as collateral for the loan, and expressly permits car title loans to use a borrower’s title to her car as collateral.  For payday loans, see TAC § 83.604 (b) (“The check given in the [payday loan] transaction may serve as security for the payment of the loan.”).  For car title loans, car title as security is not expressly prohibited under TFC § 342.503 and is stated as a permitted practice for authorized fees in TFC § 352.502 (b) (5).  However, even though the CSO statute does not expressly allow any of these collaterals, these payday and car title lenders operating as CSOs use checks and car titles as collateral respectively, as well as electronic access to a borrower’s debit account and a letter of credit issued by the CSO.

^vi Under existing Texas lending law, payday lenders and car title lenders, just like all other consumer lenders and brokers, are subject to oversight by the Texas OCCC.  Although CSOs are subject to private litigation and oversight of the Attorney General, these provisions have proven insufficient to protect consumers against abusive high cost lending.  CSOs are the only entities engaged in consumer lending transactions that escape oversight and compliance requirements of the OCCC.

I'll let you know how it goes.  This will be a first for me.

Why 10% in 10% Is Enough?

My friend and colleague Dan Rhodes posted an article on the "10% Is Enough" campaign over at the "Call and Response" blog of the Faith and Leadership program at Duke Divinity School. In a few paragraphs, he offered an brief overview of the campaign and some of the reasoning behind it. One comment chastised him for not providing an adequate analysis of the economics of consumer credit, its risks, and its basic operational principles. Dan gave a good response, acknowledging that in the short piece he could not cover everything. He also added some additional historical economic factors which are necessary to keep the discussion from pretending to be merely a technical discussion of "laws of economics." I am including here some comments I added to his post.

For centuries, banks were very profitable businesses operating under usury caps. Why are banks in our day so much more inept? Not all banks in the world charge high interest rates for credit. Why are US banks so much more inept at doing business?

We know that "risk" is calculated using benchmarks and tables and actuarial information based on certain assumptions. Of course, the assumptions may include demographic data and statistical probabilities that many can agree upon.

These assumption also include an assumed "cost of doing business" that includes the irrational exuberance of contemporary stockholders wanting short-term profits, the arrogance of CEOs with 8 figure packages, and big bonuses for executives known as "talent" who helped to bring about the economic crash. Consequently, none of the big banks is willing to name a rate of interest they believe to be too high. When asked by Congress if 36 % was too high, not one bank president would answer.

Wells Fargo/Wachovia recently introduced a new "product" for its customers. They will advance money at the end of the month to help a customer get through. Down the street from the bank, the little storefront calls this a "payday loan." Wells Fargo/Wachovia offers this "service" for an annual interest rate of 120%.

So if the banks want to be forthcoming about their cost of doing business, and if they will consider outside analysis of where they are spending frivolously, then we will be in a position to discuss what rate it would take to keep credit fair for customers, profitable for banks, and safe for everyone.

Economic Recovery for All 3: A Bailout for the Few that Did Not Trickle Down

I should mention, with thanks, the assistance of Stephen Boyd of Wake Forest University and Winston-Salem CHANGE. Steve carefully examined the earlier drafts of this document and suggested a reorganization of the material to make it more user-friendly for study.

THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON THE ECONOMY
A Working Paper for North Carolina United Power
from an Interchange Among Theological Educators
July 2009

II. The Initial Government Solution

A. Top-Down Bailout for Institutions "Too Big to Fail"
When the economic situation became too severe to ignore, government officials recommended a massive bailout of major financial institutions. With only a bare sketch of a plan, the engines of government shifted into high gear to authorize transferring hundreds of billions of dollars directly to banks and other financial institutions to prop up their endangered portfolios of assets. "Too big to fail" became a motto for saving the financial institutions that helped to create the collapse, as a way of assuring average citizens that their own economic future was bound up intimately with the success of these mega-banks.

B. Problems Remaining After the Bailout
The purpose of the bailout plan was to stabilize the financial system so that banks would be willing to lend money. Banks and other financial institutions were unwilling to lend money because they could not get a clear idea of the value of the ubiquitous securities intertwined with delinquent and "troubled" loans ("toxic assets"). By lending money, more people and businesses could buy goods and services and fuel economic recovery. However, the banks and financial institutions took the money and held it or used the money for self-aggrandizing purposes. Consequently, the bailout did not have the intended ripple effect on the economy, and it did not pump up the economy.

1. Foreclosures have increased unabated regardless of claims that programs would help people keep their homes.

2. A crisis in credit markets has led financial institutions to rewrite overnight the terms and conditions of credit cards, to the disadvantage and dismay of their customers.

3. Many have found themselves now holding more debt than they can possibly repay.

4. Bankruptcies have continued to increase resulting from credit card debt, mortgage debt, and debt arising from skyrocketing costs of health care and growing numbers of people without insurance.

Economic Recovery for All 2: Causes and Effects of the Current Crisis

THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON THE ECONOMY
A Working Paper for North Carolina United Power
from an Interchange Among Theological Educators
July 2009

I. The Economic Crisis 2008-2009: People are losing their homes. Banks are closing. Businesses are failing. Workers are losing jobs. Families are uprooted.

A. Causes
1. Artificial inflation of housing prices created an illusion of wealth.

2. Greed and irresponsibility made financial institutions eager to sell “creative” and high-risk investment products.

3. Government deregulation of financial markets allowed risky experimentation, gigantic financial conglomerates, and diminished consumer protection.

4. The complexity of financial instruments which divided, bundled, and resold mortgages again and again, led to confusion about their real value and to lack of accountability for following best practices in making loans.

5. Households overextended their debt as consumer acquisitions outpaced income.

6. Overinflated housing prices, the justifiers of high levels of debt and consumption, finally crashed (the "housing bubble" burst).

B. Effects
1. Many households faced foreclosure and the loss of shelter.

a. People owed more than their houses were worth.

b. Many people lost jobs in the weak economy and could not keep up payments.

c. Many households faced increased interest rates from Adjustable-Rate Mortgages (ARMs).

2. Growing numbers of foreclosures led to a crisis of solvency in the financial institutions holding these mortgage-backed securities.

3. The crisis in the financial institutions led to a crash in the stock market.

4. The value of pensions, homes, and investments lost value dramatically, affecting retirees, institutions depending on endowments, homeowners, investors, and the economy in general.